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lying on the rule it has generally been unnecessary to the decision but proper-sounding,
familiar, and convenient to apply. These cases fall into three groups: (i) Suits by
minority stockholders where no ratification has been attempted, defended on the
ground that a majority might later ratify. Bagshaw v. Eastern Union Ry Co., 7 Hare
114 (1849); Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912);
Endicott v. Marvel, 81 N.J.Eq. 378, 87 Atl. 230 (1913). (2) Cases of attempted ratification in which the majority probably did not understand the full import of what they
were ratifying. Berendt v. Bethlehem Sted Corp., io8 N.J.Eq. 148, 154 AtI. 321 (1931);
see Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529 (C.C.A. 6th 1g91). (3) Cases
of attempted ratification in which the majority, themselves, were guilty of "fraud" or
bad faith of some sort. Collins v. Hite, iO9 W.Va. 79, 153 S.E. 240 (1930); Godley v.
Crandall& Godley Co., 212'N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 8:8 (1914).
The confused language of the courts, especially in the cases of the third group, indicates that the maxim arose out of a failure to distinguish between the fraud in the
ratification and the fraud to be ratified. See Hazard v. Durant,iI R.I. i95, 207 (1875);
Collinsv. Hite, zog W.Va. 79, 82, 83, 153 S.E. 240, 241 (1930). In such cases the confusion did no harm. But the distinction must be made and the rule carefully evaluated
where it is shown that there was no fraud on the part of the majority stockholders.
In Kessler & Co. v. Ensley (129 Fed. 397 (C.C.Ala. 19o4)), it was held that a bona
fide majority did have the power to ratify a fraud. The court insisted that action by
the majority stockholders should not be interfered with except where the majoritity
stockholders, themselves, have done something objectionable. A ratification should be
held ineffective if the majority are motivated by interests other than the best interests
of the corporation or if an uninformed or misinformed majority has been used by
others so motivated. See Gamble v. Queens County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 99, 25 N.E.
201, 202 (189o); Kessler & Co. v. Ensley, 129 Fed. 397, 401 (C.C.Ala. 19o4).
The character of the original conduct sought to be ratified is relevant, however,
as a basis for inferring the motives of the majority or those who control the majority.
Where the conduct of the directors was dishonest there is some probability that the
ratification of the majority was part of the same scheme. The inference becomes much
stronger where a large part of the stock is owned or controlled by the interested parties.
Another strong inference as to the majority's motives may arise from an inquiry into
the benefit accruing to the corporation from the ratification. Refusal to ratify may
sometimes necessitate rescission and return of benefits received, precipitate a suit
against the corporation for damages on a quantum reruit,or abrogate a compromise
not considered unfair by the majority. See Karasik v. Pacific Eastern Corp., i8o
Atl. 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 1935). It is clear that litigation may be considered unwise
where the amount is small, success uncertain, or notoriety undesirable. It may frequently be worth while to give up the cause of action in order to avoid antagonizing
the corporate officials. But ratification which involves giving up a valuable corporate
cause of action without any comparable benefit is strong evidence of improper motives
or of ignorance of the conduct ratified. See Flynn v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 158 N.Y.
493, 53 N.E. 520 (1899).
Equity-Injunction Enjoining Prosecution of Injunction in Court of Concurrent
Jurisdiction-[Federal].-A federal district court in Georgia refused the plaintiffs'
prayer for an interlocutory injunction. The following day the plaintiffs filed a 146-
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page printed petition in a Tennessee federal district court, alleging the same cause of
action as in the Georgia case; and over the defendant's objection that the matter had
been adjudicated in the Georgia court, the Tennessee court granted a preliminary injunction. The defendant thereupon moved for a preliminary injunction in the Georgia
court to restrain the plaintiffs from taking, authorizing, or permitting any action to
enforce the Tennessee injunction. Held, injunction granted. GeorgiaPower Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, not yet reported (D.C. Ga. Dec. 23, 1936).
Several possible methods of preventing a defeated party from avoiding the decision
of one federal court by taking his case to another of concurrent jurisdiction may be
suggested. Under ordinary circumstances the doctrine of res judicata is effective to
protect the party winning in the first court; but its efficacy depends upon recognition
by the second court. In the situation presented by the principal case, the Tennessee
court's refusal to treat the first decision as resjudicatacould be counteracted only by
an appeal; yet the very object of the plaintiff in bringing the Tennessee suit and of
the defendant in bringing the second Georgia suit was to avoid the delay incident to
appeal.
Perhaps the full faith and credit clause might be relied upon in the second court by
the party winning in the first court. U.S. Const. art. 4, § 2, cl. i. But this clause is
applicable only to controversies between states, and although methods of extending
its application to the federal courts and of giving direct effect in foreign jurisdictions
to equitable decrees have been advocated (see 52 A.B.A. Rep. 292, 299 (1927)), it
could be enforced only by appeal.
The need for a more rapid means of preventing reversal by the second court might
be met by an injunction. The use of an injunction to prevent the defeated party from
pursuing his remedy in another court has been justified on two grounds: (i) a court,
having once acquired jurisdiction, feels bound (or at least privileged) to protect its
jurisdiction from collateral attack (Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 214,
22r (1918)); (2) a court may wish to protect the winning party against vexatious actions. Oatesv. MorningsideCollege, 217 Iowa 1o59, 252 N.W. 783 (1934); Foster, Place
of the Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1245 (193o). Thus it has been held
proper to grant an injunction even thQugh there is every assurance that resjudicata
might be successfully pleaded in the second court. Booth v. Leycester, i Keen 579
(1837); 91 A.L.R. 570 (1934). Such injunctions are sometimes recognized by the second court as a matter of comity; sometimes not. Fisherv. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (ig16); cf. State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court of Hennepin
County, 14o Minn. 494, 168 N.W. 589 (i918); 3o Yale L. J. 719 (193o). However, the
use of an injunction by the first court is especially likely to be an inadequate protection to the winning party if the suit being enjoined is itself an injunction suit. For if
after one court has denied injunctive relief a second court grants it, and the first court
then enjoins its enforcement, the plaintiff has either succeeded in obtaining a reversal
of the first decision or has caused an impasse which is a partial victory for himself.
If the defendant obeys the second court's injunction, the plaintiff has his advantage
pending appeal. But if the defendant violates the injunction of the second court and
is cited there for contempt, he can likewise have the plaintiff cited for having permitted
the enforcement of his injunction; and the result will be inactivity on both sides. Perceiving the confusion and "utter absurdity" that must accompany such proceedings,
some courts have been led to refuse an injunction against the prosecution of an action
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in another jurisdiction. Platto v. Deuster, 22 Wis. 460 (1868); Endter v. Lennon, 46
Wis. 299, 5o N.W. 194 (1879).
Probably the best solution of the difficulty of obtaining immediate relief from repeated injunction suits in other courts would be through an extension of the writ of
prohibition. This writ is normally used by a higher court to prevent a lower court from
hearing a case only when the lower court lacks jurisdiction in the strict sense, i.e., the
power to make a decree which will be binding upon the parties. See i Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 146 (1933); Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity, 15 Col. L. Rev. io6 (1915).
The writ has, however, been used successfully to stop proceedings in a lower court having jurisdiction over the parties where an injunction had been issued by a foreign court
of concurrent jurisdiction. State ex rd. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nortoni, 331
Mo. 764, 55 S.W. (2d) 272 (1932); 1 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 146 (1933); 46 Harv. L. Rev.
1o3o (1933). Although a wide use of writs of prohibition would be both undesirable
and unnecessary, it is but a slight extension to make them available as an immediate
remedy where judicial differences have become acute.
The dispute which culminated in the instant decision has been the subject of much
comment. The President in his message proposing that "direct and immediate appeal
to the Supreme Court" from district court rulings on the constitutionality of federal
statutes be provided, and that lower courts be prevented from enjoining their enforcement without permitting the Attorney General to intervene, pointed to cases like the
principal case as an illustration of the need for effective means of curbing differences
between courts. 81 Cong. Rec. Io84 (Feb. 5, 1937). This proposal would undoubtedly
tend to prevent a duplication of the instant situation in cases involving federal statutes; but a substantial part of the business of the federal courts involves cases in which
constitutional questions are not raised. American Law Institute, Study of the Business
of the Federal Courts, pt. 2, p. 113 (1934). The possibility of cross-injunctions of the
present type would therefore remain even though the President's recommendations
were adopted. If the writ of prohibition were made issuable ipsofacto by either a circuit court of appeals or the Supreme Court upon a showing of a prior federal adjudication, competition for advantage pending appeal would be eliminated.

Evidence-Burden of Proof on Sub-issue Raised by Improper Pleading-[Iowa].-The plaintiff brought an action for persoial injuries alleged to have been caused by the
defendant's striking her with his car. The defendant both entered a general denial and
specially pleaded that the car which struck the plaintiff was not the one which he was
driving. At the trial two witnesses testified that the defendant's car struck the plaintiff. The defendant and his wife testified to the contrary; but the defendant introduced
no evidence that another car hit the plaintiff. The trial court instructed the jury that
the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's car struck her. Held,
the instruction was erroneous. The defendant asserted the affirmative of the issue
and therefore had the burden of proof. Since he introduced no evidence, it was a nondisputed issue and should not have gone to the jury. Griffin v. Stewart, 270 N.W. 442
(Iowa 1936).
Contrary to the result reached in this case, it seems that the burden of persuasion
should be assigned on a more substantial ground than the accidents of pleading in a
particular case. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 2485 (2d ed. 1923). If the court were cor-

